In the wake of last week's Iraq-related developments in Washington, the strongest quasi-respectable argument available to Democrats who want to oppose President Bush and General Petraeus while sounding responsible is the claim that a troop drawdown larger than the one they propose is needed to "rebalance risk"--that is, that the surge in Iraq has made us more vulnerable elsewhere in the world.
This has long been a concern to more moderate Democrats, and Rep. Ike Skelton, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (and father of an Army officer), reiterated the position in his prepared statement at the Petraeus-Crocker hearings. He asked whether "Iraq is the war worth the risk of breaking our Army and being unable to deal with other risks to our nation. . . . With so many troops in Iraq, I think our response to an unexpected threat would come at a devastating cost."
This argument is a version of the concerns voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army chief, Gen. George Casey--a point not missed by Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne, who wrote that "Democrats are now hoping concerned generals will support their case [for withdrawal], even if most Republicans won't." Indeed, the goal of driving a wedge between the military and the Bush administration has been a consistent strategy of the antiwar party. As Dionne puts it, "If withdrawing troops from Iraq is dangerous, failing to withdraw them may, in the long run, be even more dangerous." Fighting now compromises future readiness.
Yet the
military logic behind this argument is weak. What are the "other risks to our nation" that are so "unexpected" and would exact such a "devastating cost"? It's a dangerous world and the risks are great, but our ability to respond is likewise great. Consider the threats the Pentagon regards as most real. A crisis across the Taiwan Strait or even a Chinese attack would call for the deployment of naval and air power--capabilities not much employed in Iraq. Suppose we collected "actionable" intelligence on Osama bin Laden's whereabouts. We'd launch air and missile strikes and perhaps a special operations raid. Again, not really a problem. Even a North Korean invasion would initially demand the strike power of naval and air forces in support of South Korea's large, well-equipped, and well-trained land forces.
In an emergency, we can even respond to the call for significant land forces. The "surged" force in Iraq of 160,000 represents only about 20 percent of active-duty Army and Marine strength, and less than 15 percent if one includes reserve and National Guard forces. It would be a struggle to make ready and to deploy another large land force--although those forces recovering from Iraq and in the reserves represent a superbly trained, equipped, experienced, and powerful force. But responding to even the most nightmarish surprise, such as a mass-destruction attack at home, is hardly impossible. We should remember that the strains of Iraq come from the length of the mission, not the surge.
The strategic logic of the "risk management" argument is similarly weak: It sharply underplays the negative consequences, in the Middle East and around the world, of a U.S. defeat in Iraq.
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