IN 1987, the Reagan administration seriously underestimated the energy and ruthlessness that its opponents would be willing to bring to bear against a Supreme Court nominee.

There was no excuse for being thus taken by surprise: earlier campaigns against various Court of Appeals nominees had shown what the organized left was willing to do. For example, Daniel Manion--confirmed in a squeaker, by a Republican Senate; Alex Kozinski--confirmed after suffering attacks for demanding work from his employees; Jeff Sessions--defeated by a 10-8 Judiciary Committee vote (with Arlen Specter, now chairman of the Judiciary Committee member, among the nays). These experiences even led to the publication by the Free Congress Foundation of a book called The Judges' War, edited by Patrick McGuigan. And all this was before the Bork battle.

The first sign that Judge Bork would become the victim of a one-sided war was the fact that nothing was done on his behalf throughout the long slow-news season of July and August.

Nothing was done by Bork himself, because he respected the traditions of his profession, and it was considered unseemly for judicial nominees to "campaign." Nothing was done by the administration because the White House didn't think it was necessary. (Full disclosure: I was at the Justice Department at that time, and I have some reason to think a more aggressive strategy was advocated at our quarters than in the West Wing.) And little was done by "the groups," because there simply were not that many activists on the right focused on

As if failing to show up on the battlefield were not bad enough, the administration's timing played perfectly into the hands of Ted Kennedy, Ralph Neas, et al. The nomination was announced just before the Fourth of July weekend. Kennedy rushed to the Senate floor with his infamous "In Judge Bork's America" speech, and that was what resounded through the media all through the long weekend. The speech galvanized anti-Bork forces, but its principal impact was probably that of chilling potential supporters and preventing early commitments to vote for the nominee.

Furthermore, far from sitting back and enjoying the ripple effects of his speech, Kennedy then spent the Fourth of July weekend phoning leaders of liberal activist groups, sharing with them Ralph Neas's opinion that defeating Bork was "eminently doable," and assuring them, in case they had doubted it, that their efforts would find a sympathetic echo within the Senate Judiciary Committee.

One could go on, but the story of the anti-Bork strategies has been told before. The important point is that this is not 1987. For one thing, conservative groups are ready--several of them, adequately funded, with both elite and grassroots leadership, and covering social and business conservatives alike. And the White House, whether it has the stomach for a fight or not, will at least not be surprised if it gets one.

As of this writing, no nominee has been announced; all we have on the table is Justice O'Connor's resignation (effective when her replacement is confirmed, so she'll be back next year if the fight drags on), escalating rumors about Chief Justice Rehnquist, and faint rumors about Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. But all these rumors could come to fruition, and that would not affect my principal recommendation to the administration: do not announce any nominees until Labor Day, or late August at the earliest.